

THE AUTHENTICITY OF THUCYDIDES 3.84*

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For well over a century, Thucydidean scholars have debated the authenticity of Chapter 84 in Book Three of the *Histories*.¹ Most scholars have followed the scholiast in rejecting the passage as a spurious appendage to Thucydides' excursus on the Corcyraean stasis (3.82–83). Typical are the opinions voiced by Classen and Gomme in their major commentaries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively: Classen labels the passage "Reflexionen eines späteren Moralisten über den Inhalt der beiden vorausgehenden Kapitel"; Gomme asserts "it is...[a] moderately good imitation of Thucydides—not, I think, written in parody, and perhaps not with intent to deceive..."² In the most recent article devoted to the controversy, Fuks contends that Chapter 84 must be rejected "not only on grounds of transmission and language"—the traditional reasons for regarding it as spurious—"but also on contents."³ The "economic

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¹ Scholars who have rejected the passage as inauthentic include: J. Classen, *Thukydides*³, vol. 3, revised by J. Steup (Berlin 1892) 173–75 and 275; G. Jachmann, "Ein Kapitel des Thukydides," *Klio* 33 (1940) 235–44; O. Luschkat, "Die Thukydides-scholien," *Philologus* 98 (1954) 35–36; A. W. Gomme, *HCT* vol. 2 (Oxford 1956) 382–83; P. Huart, *Le vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide = Etudes et Commentaires* 69 (Paris 1968) 63 n. 1 and 484 n. 1; A. Fuks, "Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra," *AJP* 92 (1971) 48–55; C. Schneider, *Information und Absicht bei Thukydides*, Hypomnemata 41 (Göttingen 1974) 35 n. 67; L. Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis," *IJSCP* 79 (1975) 74 n. 9; C. W. Macleod, "Thucydides on Faction," *PCPS* 205 (1979) 64 n. 1; H. J. Gehrke, *Stasis = Vestigia* 35 (München 1985) 368–69. Others implicitly reject the passage. See, e.g., I. A. F. Bruce, "The Corcyraean Civil War of 427 B.C.," *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 115 n. 17, and M. Cogan, "Mytilene, Plataea, and Corcyra," *Phoenix* 35 (1981) 1–2.

Defenders of the authenticity of the chapter include: L. Straub, "Ueber Thukyd. III, 84," *Philologus* 70 (1911) 565–69; E. Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Bonn 1919) 282–88; F. E. Adcock, "On Thucydides III, 17," *Cambridge Historical Journal* 1 (1923–25) 321; E. Topitsch, "Die Psychologie der Revolution bei Thukydides (Die Frage der Echtheit von Kapitel III 84.)," *WS* 60 (1942) 9–22; E. Wenzel, "Zur Echtheitsfrage von Thukydides 3, 84," *WS* 81 (1968) 18–27; W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton 1984) 102 n. 60. The above will be cited by author's name. All translations of Thucydides are adapted from Crawley.

² Classen 173 and Gomme 383.

³ Fuks 49.

explanation” of stasis found in this chapter, he asserts, cannot be the work of Thucydides.⁴ Proponents of the chapter’s authenticity, on the other hand, have won few converts. Schwartz’s thesis that it is an earlier draft of the material in the preceding chapters has drawn widespread criticism,⁵ while Wenzel’s more recent defense of the chapter on broader grounds has been dismissed as “wholly unconvincing.”⁶ A close examination of the evidence, however, shows that Chapter 84 is in all respects Thucydidean. Neither the traditional grounds of transmission and language nor Fuks’ new arguments on the basis of content justify its rejection from the Thucydidean corpus.

Modern skepticism concerning the authenticity of Chapter 84 arises from a medieval scholiast’s note:⁷

τὰ ὀβελισμένα οὐδενὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν ἔδοξε Θουκυδίδου εἶναι.
ἀσαφὴ γὰρ καὶ τῷ τύπῳ τῆς ἐρμηνείας καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι
πολὺν ἐμφαίνοντα τὸν νεωτερισμόν.

The obelized material did not seem to any of the commentators to belong to Thucydides. For it is unclear, displaying much innovation both in its manner of expression and in its thought.⁸

It is not clear who these earlier “commentators” were or when they were active. Since, however, Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first century B.C. alludes to the availability of an ἐξήγησις γραμματικὴ for those struggling with Thucydides’ prose in his day (*De Thuc.* 51), it is possible that the scholiast’s sources date back at least that far.

Scholars have sought in vain external evidence in the transmission of the text to corroborate the commentators’ rejection of Chapter 84 on internal aesthetic and philological grounds. Many have wrongly inferred that this chapter did not appear in Dionysius’ text of Thucydides since he fails to mention it in his stylistic critique of Chapters 82–83 in his *On Thucydides* (28–33).⁹ Arguments *ex silentio* are always suspect, and this one is particularly so. Dionysius passes over not only Chapter 84 in his discussion, but also

⁴ Fuks 55.

⁵ See especially Jachmann 235ff.

⁶ Fuks 48 n. 4.

⁷ The note appears in Augustanus (F) and Laurentianus (C) with only slight variation.

⁸ Straub (565) sensibly argues that the scholiast sets forth three reasons for the rejection of Chapter 84 by earlier commentators: “1. Unklarheit, 2. Neuerungen im Sprachgebrauch, und 3. ungewöhnliche Gedanken.” Cf. Wenzel 19. The nuance of all the critical terms used by the scholiast is open to interpretation. ‘Ἀσαφής, for example, may refer to a lack of clarity in the chain of thought in the passage, as Straub (566) suggests, or to a more general “obscurity” or “obtuseness.” On Dionysius’ vague use of the term ἀσάφεια in his discussion of Thucydides, see W. K. Pritchett, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides* (Berkeley 1975) 139 n. 13.

⁹ Classen (275), for example, argues that if Chapter 84 had been in Dionysius’ text, surely he would have mentioned it, since it provides many more opportunities for stylistic criticism than the preceding chapters. See Pritchett (above, note 8) 117 n. 7, for an introduction to the dispute over the significance of Dionysius’ omission of Chapter 84.

significant portions of Chapters 82–83.¹⁰ Either these passages too were absent from Dionysius' text of Thucydides, or Dionysius is selective in his treatment here and his silence about a particular passage tells us nothing about the state of his text. Since Dionysius himself notes at the conclusion of his analysis of 3.82–83 that he must be selective in order that his "treatise may not exceed its proper length (33)," the latter conclusion is obviously to be preferred.¹¹

The quest for external evidence of the inauthenticity of Chapter 84 is taken to extreme lengths by Jachmann. Jachmann rightly is troubled by the scholiast's testimony that ἀσάφεια led ancient commentators to obelize the chapter, since the same charge might be leveled against the two preceding chapters.¹² Rather than concluding, however, that the passage has been obelized unjustly, he asserts that a more legitimate reason must have led to its rejection in antiquity. Jachmann thus traces our scholiast's note back to the "wissenschaftliche" edition of an authoritative Alexandrian scholar who must have obelized Chapter 84 since it was not included in many exemplars available to him.¹³ Even if we accept the conjecture that the note has an Alexandrian source, it does not follow that the original motive for obelizing Chapter 84 was textual. Recent work on the Homeric scholarship of the Alexandrians suggests that their reliance on manuscript evidence has been seriously overestimated.¹⁴

Since speculation concerning the textual transmission of Chapter 84 does little to advance the debate over its authenticity, the passage's internal characteristics deserve to be the focus of scholarly discussion. While the scholiast does not specify what parts of Chapter 84 led to its rejection on aesthetic and philological grounds, modern scholarship commonly cites three aspects of the

¹⁰ Dionysius' most significant omission from 3.82–83 consists of the fourteen lines from 82.1.5–82.3.1. He also omits a phrase at 82.4.5–82.4.6, as well as five lines from 82.6.5–82.7.4.

¹¹ It is possible that Dionysius passes over Chapter 84 because the commentators of his day regarded it as spurious. In this case, his omission of the passage would simply confirm what most scholars already accept, namely, that Chapter 84 was deemed suspect by an exegetical tradition that dates back at least to Dionysius' time. See Topitsch 18 n. 11, and Wenzel 20.

¹² Jachmann 241.

¹³ Jachmann 241–42. If Jachmann is correct, one might postulate three stages in the history of Chapter 84 before modern times. First, scholars in Alexandria obelized the chapter on textual grounds. Later, perhaps in Dionysius' time, commentators raised aesthetic and philological objections to the already obelized passage. Finally, the scholiast, conflating these two earlier stages, reports that the chapter was obelized by commentators and lists their reasons for rejecting it. The initial textual basis for obelizing Chapter 84 is thus obscured by the scholiast's testimony.

¹⁴ See, for example, M. van der Valk, "The *Iliad* and Its Ancient Commentators: Some Textual Notes," *GRBS* 23 (1982) 293–303; "Manuscripts and Scholia: Some Textual Problems," *GRBS* 25 (1984) 39–49; and "A Few Observations on the Homeric Text," *Mnemosyne* 38 (1985) 376–78. See also W. J. Slater, "Aristophanes of Byzantium and Problem-Solving in the Museum," *CQ* 32 (1982) 336–49. For a critique of some of Slater's arguments, however, see D. L. Blank and A. R. Dyck, "Aristophanes of Byzantium and Problem-Solving in the Museum: Notes on a Recent Reassessment," *ZPE* 56 (1984) 17–24.

passage as evidence of its inauthenticity: 1) the rough connection between it and the surrounding chapters; 2) its language; and 3) its general content.¹⁵

STRUCTURE

Critics of Chapter 84 assert that it interrupts the logical development of Thucydides' description of stasis. Following upon a general treatment of stasis in the Hellenic world, "[i]t apparently returns to the special case of Kerkyra, only to generalize again after the first clause; and we return again to Kerkyra in 85.1."¹⁶ According to this view, we must choose between the false conclusion to the excursus marked by δ' οὖν in 84.1 and the true conclusion signaled by οὖν in 85.1.

Even if we admit that Chapter 84 might be better integrated into its context, nothing compels us to attribute this defect to the incompetence of an interpolator. Surely it is possible that Thucydides, an author known for ἀσάφεια from antiquity,¹⁷ is himself responsible for it. This possibility becomes a likelihood when we consider the nature of the narrative in which Chapter 84 appears.

Thucydides' excursus on the Corcyraean stasis is among the least structured and most discursive narratives in the *Histories*. This may be due to the fact that it is an unrevised draft¹⁸ or to the ineffable horror of the events that Thucydides was attempting to describe. In any case, the narrative develops not so much by structured argument as by the examination and reexamination of the forces that reduce civic life to chaos: ὀργή, τιμωρία, τόλμα and πλεονεξία.¹⁹ The repetition of these key words throughout the narrative is matched at several points by the repetition of entire phrases:

καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ... πολεμουμένων δὲ (3.82.1)	ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ... ὁ δὲ πόλεμος (3.82.2)
πᾶσα τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου (3.81.5)	οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας (3.83.1) ²⁰

Repetition and subsequent elaboration, rather than economy of expression and linear progression of argumentation, are clearly the norm here. The repetition of οὖν in 84.1 and 85.1 can thus hardly be viewed as an aberration in an otherwise concise and orderly narrative. Given the expansive nature of Thucydides' narrative at this point in the *Histories*, it should not surprise us that in 84.1 he "returns to the special case of Kerkyra, only to generalize again after the first clause." If this aspect of Chapter 84 is an aesthetic flaw, it is one shared by the

¹⁵ Cf. Wenzel's (20–21) similar division of the challenges posed to Chapter 84.

¹⁶ Gomme 382. Cf. Jachmann 243.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Dionysius, *De Thuc.* 52.

¹⁸ For this view, see Schwartz 287–88.

¹⁹ These words and others based on the same stems occur nineteen times in 3.82–85.1. For a detailed analysis of the verbal echoes within 3.82–83, see Macleod 58–60.

²⁰ For a discussion of Thucydides' use of the phrase πᾶσα ἰδέα in the *Histories*, see S. Flory, "Πᾶσα ἰδέα in Thucydides," *AJP* 109 (1988) 12–19.

preceding chapters. It is inconsistent only with an externally imposed standard and not with its Thucydidean context.²¹

LANGUAGE

Some have argued that the language of Chapter 84 betrays its late origins. Since some innovation in language is to be expected in any author, however, it is natural to ask at what point the degree of innovation in a passage indicates that it *must* be the work of a later writer. Presumably the threshold is quite high for Thucydides, given his predilection for coining new words and stretching the meaning of old words.²² A further complication is that the low survival rate of other examples of fifth-century prose makes it difficult to determine when an apparent neologism in Thucydides is truly without precedent.

Let us consider the most frequently cited neologism in Chapter 84 as an illustration of the dangers of judging the passage spurious on the basis of its language. More than any other part of Chapter 84, the phrase διὰ πάθους (“passionately”) has been invoked as proof of its late date. It is not until Aristotle, scholars maintain, that πάθος takes on the abstract sense of “passion”; in Thucydides’ time it should refer to a more concrete “suffering” or “experience.”²³ Such a rigid view of the use of πάθος in the late fifth century, however, is unwarranted.

Thucydides’ contemporaries push πάθος well beyond the narrow range of physical “experience.” Sophocles, for example, in his *Philoctetes* (409 B.C.), presents the following exchange between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus:

Φι. ἀπορεῖς δὲ τοῦ σὺ; μὴ λέγ', ὦ τέκνον, τάδε.
Νε. ἀλλ' ἐνθάδ' ἤδη τοῦδε τοῦ πάθους κυρῶ. (898–99)

Here, πάθος must be understood as a reference to Neoptolemus’ mental state of ἀπορία. A more daring extension of the meaning of πάθος occurs in the *Ajax* (ca. 442 B.C.) when the chorus lament the death of Ajax:

τοῖά μοι
πάννυχα καὶ φαέθοντ'
ἀνεστέναζες ὁμόφρων
ἐχθοδόπ' Ἀτρείδαις
οὐλίφ σὺν πάθει. (928–32)

Such, I see, was the nature of the hostile things against the
Atreidai which you were groaning out during the night and the

²¹ Topitsch (14–15) provides a good analysis of the arrangement of the elements within Chapter 84.

²² Dionysius repeatedly calls attention to this Thucydidean idiosyncrasy. See, e.g., *De Thuc.* 24 and 28, and *De Dem.* 10. Cf. Pritchett (above, note 8) 110 n. 4.

²³ Proponents of this view include Classen (173–74), Gomme (382) and Huart (63 n. 1). It is plausible that the charge of νεωτερισμός recorded by the scholiast stems from this use of πάθος. See Straub 565, Topitsch 18 n. 10, and Wenzel 21 n. 14. While most scholars have agreed that διὰ πάθους must mean “passionately” here, Topitsch (10–12) suggests that it should be understood as “in consequence of their distressful circumstances” (“infolge bedrängter Lage”). For this sense of διὰ with the genitive, Topitsch (10 n. 3) cites Thuc. 6.10.2: διὰ ξυμφορῶν.

morning light in the stubbornness of your heart, with fatal passion.²⁴

It is reasonable to follow Jebb and Stanford in taking πάθος as “passion” in this context.²⁵ Its close association with the attributes of a passionate disposition (οὐλίφ: cf. ὠμόφρων and ἐχθοδόπ’) favors such an interpretation.²⁶

A fragment of Democritus provides unambiguous evidence of πάθος used in the sense of “passion”:

ιατρική μὲν γὰρ κατὰ Δημόκριτον σώματος νόσους ἀκέεται,
σοφίη δὲ ψυχὴν παθὼν ἀφαιρεῖται. (D.-K. 68 B 31)

The analogy νόσος: σῶμα :: πάθος: ψυχὴ makes it evident that πάθος signifies an infirmity of the soul, namely, passion.²⁷

Against such a backdrop of contemporary usage, Thucydides’ use of πάθος in the sense of “passion” in Chapter 84 does not appear so radical. In fact, this is but one of several instances in the *Histories* where the stem παθ-, in close conjunction with the stem ἐπιθυμ-, refers to an internal, emotional “experience” or “passion.” In each case, ἐπιθυμ- provides a gloss on παθ-, making it clear that Thucydides is following contemporary innovators in using παθ- to describe human passion.

The nuance of the stem παθ- in Chapter 84 is evident from its context:

πενίας δὲ τῆς εἰθυίας ἀπαλλαξείοντές τινες, μάλιστα δ’ ἂν
διὰ πάθους, ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην
γινώσκοιεν...

[Corcyra gave the first example] of the iniquitous resolves of those who desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty and in their passion longed to acquire their neighbors’ possessions...

The close association of πάθος with ἐπιθυμοῦντες and the desiderative ἀπαλλαξείοντες colors our understanding of it. πάθος refers here not to a concrete “experience,” but an emotional one that manifests itself in the passions of longing and desire.

A similar conjunction of the stems παθ- and ἐπιθυμ- occurs at two other points in the *Histories*. At 6.13.1, Nicias urges the older Athenians in his audience to oppose the Sicilian expedition:

μηδ’, ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων,
γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοία δὲ
πλεῖστα...

²⁴ The translation is W. B. Stanford’s (*Sophocles: Ajax* [London 1963] 181).

²⁵ See R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles: Ajax* (Cambridge 1896) 143 and Stanford (above, note 24) 181. Jebb notes the unusual use of πάθος here and in *Soph., Ph.* 899.

²⁶ J. C. Kamerbeek doubts “whether πάθει can be rendered by ‘passion’...instead of ‘frame of mind’” here (*The Plays of Sophocles: The Ajax* [Leiden 1953] 187). It is noteworthy, however, that Kamerbeek’s skepticism stems from the assumption that Thucydides 3.84 (“where διὰ πάθους occurs possibly in the sense of ‘with passion’”) is spurious.

²⁷ Topitsch (17–18) was apparently the first to cite this passage in the context of the debate over Thucydides 3.84. Cf. the use of πάθημα in the sense of “emotion” or “passion” in Gorgias’ *Encomium on Helen* (D.-K. 82 B 11, 9).

and not to suffer what our young men would, namely, a hopeless passion for that which is absent, remembering how rarely success is achieved by longing and how often by forethought...²⁸

The close connection of the stem παθ- with the passions that appear here suggests that it refers to an emotional perturbation.²⁹ The old, according to Nicias, must not succumb to the passions of the young (ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν), i.e., ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία, if the city is to prosper.³⁰

Archidamus invokes similar words to dissuade the Lacedaimonians from declaring war against the Athenians:

καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὄρω, ὥστε μήτε ἀπειρία ἐπιθυμῆσαι τινα τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν, μήτε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς νομίσαντα. (1.80.1)

I have had experience of many wars in my life, Lacedaimonians, and I see among you men of the same age as myself who would neither long for war from inexperience—although many men would conceive just such a passion—nor from a belief in its advantage and its safety.

Desire (ἐπιθυμῆσαι) for war is presented here as a passion that often grips men (πάθοιεν). Once more we can observe the direct connection of the stem παθ- to human passions in Thucydides.

It would thus be unreasonable to reject Chapter 84 on the grounds that its use of πάθος in the sense of “passion” must be of late date. Thucydides’ contemporaries provide adequate testimony to this particular usage. Thucydides himself makes it clear when it is this nuance of the stem παθ- that he is using by glossing it with the stem ἐπιθυμ-.³¹ The fact that the most celebrated neologism in Chapter 84 is plausibly Thucydidean argues for the exercise of extreme caution in using such evidence in the authenticity debate.³²

²⁸ W. Arrowsmith translates: “Do not, like the young men, indulge in hopeless passions for distant impossibilities...” (“Aristophanes’ *Birds*: The Fantasy Politics of Eros,” *Arion* n. s. 1 [1973] 143).

²⁹ Cf. the use of the verb ἐπεπόνθεσαν in 6.88.1 to describe the feelings experienced by the Camarinaeans after listening to the debate between Hermocrates and Euphemus.

³⁰ For the notion that “desire” is something that men “suffer,” see also the phrase ἐρωτικὸν πάθος in Plato, *Phaedrus* 265b6 (cited by Straub 565).

³¹ Does Thucydides ever deviate from this practice? L. Edmunds (*Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* [Cambridge, Mass. 1975] 194–95 provides an interesting case in which πάθος may be used without a gloss in the sense of “passion.” Edmunds notes that Thucydides, at the beginning of his narrative (in Book 6) of the assassination of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, “refers to the event as a whole as having come about δι’ ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν (through the mishap of a love affair) (6.54.1). In conclusion he uses the phrase τοῦ πάθους τῇ δυστυχίᾳ (by the mischance of the passion) (6.55.4).”

³² Other features of the passage that have troubled scholars include:

1) ἂν (3.84.1). Gomme (383) objects to the use of the optative here: “since καὶ ὅποσα means ‘and all those deeds which,’ with προντολήμῃ understood after καί, the deeds should be those done in Kerkyra, and we expect ἔδρασαν,

CONTENT

Fuks asserts that the “economic explanation” of stasis in Chapter 84 could only be the work of a late author who “lived in times of socio-revolutionary stasis.”³³ This explanation, he argues, is inconsistent with 1) the preceding chapters, 2) the *Histories* in general, and 3) a fifth-century context.³⁴ Each of these assertions is false.

1. The Description of Stasis

Fuks contends that Chapter 84 differs significantly from the preceding chapters in its analysis of stasis:

Economic explanation is, I suggest, conspicuous by its absence from Thucydides’ analysis of the stasis in Corcyra and its effects in Chaps. 82–83. In sharp contrast, economic causes and economic concepts are conspicuous in Ch. 84, and the general interpretation of the stasis is different.³⁵

Such a distinction, however, is unjustified. Both Chapter 84 and the preceding chapters suggest that men participate in stasis for a variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, a desire to better their material condition.

Let us consider first the explanation of stasis offered in Chapter 84:

ἐν δ’ οὖν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν προντολήθη, καὶ ὁπόσα

(A) ὕβρει μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλεόν ἢ σωφροσύνη ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δράσειαν,

(B) πενίας δὲ τῆς εἰωθυίας ἀπαλλαξείοντές τινες, μάλιστα δ’ ἂν διὰ πάνθους, ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γινώσκοιεν,

(C) οἳ τε μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξία, ἀπὸ ἴσου δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιόντες ἀπαιδευσία ὀργῆς πλεῖστον ἐκφερόμενοι ὡμῶς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν.

ἔγνωσαν, ἐπῆλθον.” The shift to the potential optative after the first clause, however, is consistent with the generalizing tone of the remainder of Chapter 84. Even if this transition from the specific case of Corcyra to the Greek world in general seems rough, this is not a strong argument against the passage’s authenticity. For further discussion of this problem, see Wenzel 23.

2) ἀπὸ ἴσου (3.84.1). The usual Thucydidean phrase is ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου (cf. 1.77.3, 1.77.4, 1.99.2 etc.). Topitsch (18), however, argues that Thucydides’ omission of the article in such phrases simply gives them a more general character. As evidence of this practice, he cites Thucydides’ variable use of ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου and ἐξ ἴσου.

3) ἐν ᾧ (3.84.2). Classen’s (174) translation of this phrase as “in welchem Falle” leads him to label the ensuing clause a tautology. Cf. Jachmann 243. The tautology disappears, however, if we follow Topitsch (13) in taking the phrase as “unter Umständen, in denen.” Cf. Wenzel 25.

³³ Fuks 55.

³⁴ Fuks 53.

³⁵ Fuks 53.

Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes alluded to: (A) of the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from their rulers—when their hour came; (B) of the iniquitous resolves of those who desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty and in their passion longed to acquire their neighbors' possessions; (C) and lastly, of the savage and pitiless excesses into which men hastened, not out of greed—as they were as rich as their enemies³⁶—but borne by their ungovernable passions.

Three motives, political (A), economic (B), and personal (C) in nature are ascribed here to the *stasiotai*. Civic violence provides an opportunity for some to lash out against their political oppressors, for others to escape from poverty, and for still others to sate their personal appetites for savage excess. No indication is given that any one of these motives is more important than the others. They are simply listed (μέν...δέ...τε) without further elaboration of their relative importance.³⁷ The proportion of *stasiotai* motivated by economic factors is left vague: we are told only that some (τινες) engage in civic violence to win release from poverty.

What Fuks has overlooked is that Thucydides provides a similar analysis of stasis in 3.81.4. Before commencing his general excursus on stasis, the historian succinctly describes the horrors of the Corcyraean revolution and the complex motives of its participants:

...Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον,

(A') τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν,

(C') ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἐχθρας ἔνεκα,

(B') καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων.

....the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow-citizens whom they regarded as their enemies: (A') and although the crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the democracy, (C') some were slain also for private hatred, (B') others by their debtors because of the moneys owed to them.

The same three motives for civic violence advanced in 3.84.1, political (A'), economic (B'), and personal (C') considerations, are present here. What might appear to be politically motivated violence, Thucydides indicates, can in some cases be traced back to personal enmity or indebtedness. Once again, however, the relative importance of economic factors is left uncertain: an unspecified number (ἄλλοι) of men died in stasis at the hands of their debtors.³⁸

³⁶ I follow here Gomme's (382) translation of ἀπὸ ἴσου. On the role of this phrase in the authenticity debate, see above, note 32.

³⁷ The use of τε to introduce the third member in a list is Thucydidean. See Classen 174.

³⁸ Fuks (49), in discussing this passage, asserts that "the stasis which breaks out is by no means due to indebtedness. The outrage appears in his story as a

A comparison of 3.84.1 and 3.81.4 thus reveals no inconsistency in their explanation of stasis. Economic motives are neither particularly conspicuous in the former, nor absent in the latter. In each case, one of the three motives cited is economic, poverty in 3.84.1 and indebtedness in 3.81.4. In neither case is this motive presented as more or less important than the political and personal motives for stasis cited along with it.³⁹ There would appear then to be no basis for attributing these two passages to different authors.

2. *The Histories*

Economic motives appear as a potential source of disorder not only in the description of stasis, but also throughout the *Histories*. Diodotus, for example, asserts that severe penalties will not deter men from committing offenses as long as *πενία* fills them with daring, or *ἐξουσία* with greed (3.45.4).⁴⁰ The vulnerability of the polis to such forces is indirectly evident in Pericles' funeral oration. Pericles goes to great lengths to veil the tension between rich and poor in his depiction of an ideal Athens.⁴¹ Poverty, he proclaims, is not a source of shame in Athens, nor wealth a reason for boasting (2.40.1); rich and poor alike share in the dangers of the battlefield (2.42.4) as well as the honors of public office (2.37.1). There would be little point to this emphasis on the equilibrium between rich and poor in Athens if economic tensions were not viewed as a potential source of dissension within the city. If civic unity, in Thucydides' mind, consists in part of an equilibrium between rich and poor, it is only natural that in 3.84 he depict civic disunity in time of stasis as involving a rift between these groups.

Further evidence of Thucydides' belief in the importance of economic motives in stasis can be found in his brief account of civil strife in Leontini (5.4). There, he notes, the upper classes expelled the demos when it was discovered that they were planning to redivide the land (*τὴν γῆν...ἀναδάσασθαι*).⁴² Obviously, if Thucydides can depict stasis in Leontini as arising exclusively from economic tensions, there is nothing implausible about his inclusion of economic motives as one source of stasis in 3.84.

concomitant of the stasis raging in Corcyra, not as its motive." Thucydides, however, makes no such subtle distinction between concomitants of stasis and motives for it in either 3.81.4 or 3.84.1. Human nature is the ultimate source of civic violence in both Chapter 84 and the preceding chapters (cf. 3.82.2 and 3.84.2). The variety of motives presented in 3.81.4 and 3.84.1 are simply different manifestations of this common nature.

³⁹ Such a presentation of economic motives is consistent with S. B. Smith's general observation that "[e]conomic facts appeared to [Thucydides] to constitute one—an important one, to be sure, but only one—of the springs of human action" ("The Economic Motive in Thucydides," *HSCP* 51 [1940] 301).

⁴⁰ For further discussion of the relationship between 3.45 and 3.84, see Topitsch 15–16. Cf. Wenzel 26.

⁴¹ For a discussion of the tendency of the Attic funeral orations to veil tensions within the city, see N. Loraux, *L'invention d'Athènes* (Paris 1981) 31–37 and 335–40.

⁴² This important passage is mentioned briefly in G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London 1981) 608 n. 54. Cf. Thucydides' description of stasis in Samos (8.21), where the victorious demos divide among themselves the land and houses of the vanquished upper classes.

3. Fifth-Century Views

Thucydides is not alone among his contemporaries in acknowledging the possible economic roots of stasis.⁴³ Aristophanes, for example, in his *Frogs* (405 B.C.), presents personal gain (κέρδος) as a motive for inciting civil strife. The chorus of happy initiates (359-60) banish from their number anyone who “rouses up stasis and fans its flames through desire for personal gain” (ἀνεγείρει καὶ ῥιπίζει κερδῶν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμῶν).⁴⁴ In his *Heracles* (ca. 417 B.C.), Euripides develops in greater detail the idea that men might become *stasiotai* in hope of material gain. AmphiTryon describes Lycus’ power base in Thebes as follows:

πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀλβίους δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
δοκοῦντας εἶναι συμμάχους ἄναξ ἔχει,
οἳ στάσιν ἔθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν
ἐφ’ ἀρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας, τὰ δ’ ἐν δόμοις
δαπάναισι φροῦδα διαφυγόνθ’ ὑπ’ ἀργίας. (588–92)

In this passage, it is impoverished nobles who promote stasis ἐφ’ ἀρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας;⁴⁵ in Thucydides 3.84.1, it is poor men who participate in stasis so as τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν.⁴⁶ While the agents differ, the economic motive for stasis is the same in each case. Clearly, the appearance of an “economic explanation” of stasis in Chapter 84 is consistent with a fifth-century context and hence Thucydidean authorship. We need not ascribe it to a late author who “lived in times of socio-revolutionary stasis.”

CONCLUSIONS

Modern scholarship has failed to produce any compelling evidence, external or internal, of the inauthenticity of Chapter 84. The scholiast’s testimony that ancient commentators regarded the chapter as spurious has prejudiced modern scholars against it. What should be regarded as a shortcoming of ancient scholarship—the confident rejection of a Thucydidean passage on aesthetic and philological grounds—has given rise instead to a variety of unreasonable attacks on Chapter 84. Few genuine Thucydidean passages could survive such an onslaught.

In 1911, Straub posed a question to critics of Chapter 84 that remains unanswered: why would anyone compose such an imitation of Thucydides and how would it come to be included in the text?⁴⁷ The Thucydidean density of the

⁴³ The notion that desire for personal gain lies at the roots of stasis is a commonplace with origins well before Thucydides’ time. See, e.g., Solon 4 (Edmunds) and Theognis 39–52. For additional examples, see M. F. Williams, “Two Traditional Elements in Thucydides’ Corcyrean Excursus,” *CW* 79 (1985) 2 n. 6.

⁴⁴ Cf. Thucydides 3.84.2: in time of stasis, men set personal gain (τὸ κερδαίνειν) above justice.

⁴⁵ For a defense of this passage against charges of inauthenticity, see G. W. Bond, *Euripides: Heracles* (Oxford 1981) 212–14.

⁴⁶ On the historic tension between rich and poor in late fifth-century Athens, see J. K. Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece* (Stanford 1983) 122.

⁴⁷ Straub 566. Connor poses the same question (102 n. 60).

passage rules out the possibility that it is an attempt to clarify what precedes it. Nothing in its content suggests that it is the interpolation of a later ideologue.

Those who reject Chapter 84 regard it as the work of a fairly sophisticated imitator of Thucydides who reveals himself through a variety of inconsistencies and anachronisms. An examination of these alleged defects, however, uncovers nothing un-Thucydidean. Thucydides would appear to be his own best imitator.